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ALLUSION AND STRUCTURE IN HORACE SATIRE 2.1: THE CALLIMACHEAN RESPONSE

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In the face of criticism from two different groups, the public at large, which feared satiric verse (as described in *Sat.* 1.4.21ff.), and the *Lucili fautores* in particular, who preferred Lucilius' more pungent style (1.10.1ff.), Horace vindicates his brand of satire for the third time in the introductory satire of his second book. Like Callimachus before him (*Aetia* 1.1ff. Pf.) and Propertius after (2.1.1ff.), to mention only two examples, the poet begins his new collection of poems with a statement on his poetic mission. This he presents in the guise of a consultation with C. Trebatius Testa, a well-known contemporary jurisconsult who offers three suggestions for dealing with the present criticism: give up writing verse entirely (5–6); write epic poetry celebrating the military victories of Octavian (10–12); or write Lucilian "panegyric" satire in honor of Octavian's civic virtues (16–17). Horace refuses each suggestion (6–7; 12–15; 17–20) and explains why he must write poetry, why this poetry must be satire, and why only those who attack him need fear his verse (20–78).

Satire 2.1 contains the earliest example of a *recusatio* to Octavian.[1] Yet one might think it odd that in Horace's first use of this conceit no secure reference to its inventor—either allusive (e.g., Vergil, *Ec.* 6.3–5; cf. Call. *Aetia* 1.21–28 Pf.) or direct (e.g., Prop. 2.1.39–40)—has been found.[2] The conceit originates after all in Callimachus' refusal to compose μεγάλα βιβλία about either princes or heroes.[3] In this paper, I hope to show that Horace has alluded to a specific text of Callimachus; that the allusion follows a pattern of allusions in the first half of the poem; that it fits into a pattern of Callimachean allusions in the apolo-

[1] W. Wimmel, *Kallimachos in Rom. Die Nachfolge seines apologetischen Dichtens in der Augusteerzeit*, Hermes Einzelschriften 16 (Wiesbaden 1960) 163.

[2] Wimmel (above, note 1) 162–67 has underlined the many Callimachean features of the satire without sufficiently demonstrating that Horace imitated a particular text.

[3] Cf. *Aetia* 1.1–6 Pf. See Wimmel (above, note 1) 150 and A. Thill, *Alter ab illo. Recherches sur l'imitation dans la poésie personelle à l'époque Augustéenne* (Paris 1979) 250–52.

getic satires (1.4 and 1.10); and that it is structurally balanced in the second half of the poem by a second reference to the same Callimachean passage.

To begin, I offer the following schematic analysis of the poem:

I		
A	Introduction: the case against Horace	1–5a
B	Analysis of the *status*[4] of Horatian satire:	
	1) stop writing (*status coniecturalis*)	5b–9
	2) write epic (*status definitionis*)	10–15
	3) write panegyric satire (*status qualitatis*)	16–20
II		
B′	Horace's rebuttal:	
	1) a. Trebatius: satire is unpopular to all	21–23
	b. Horace: need to write poetry in a pugnacious spirit	24–39a
	2) Horatian satire is defensive	39b–60a
	3) a. Trebatius: satire is unpopular to the powerful	60b–62a
	b. Horace: friendship with the great is protection against *invidia*	62b–78a
A′	Conclusion: Horace will write *bona* and not *mala carmina*	78b–86

The first and shorter division of the poem comprises two sections. In the first (IA), Horace by way of introduction recites to his counselor the twin charges against his satire and invites response:

> Sunt quibus in satura videar nimis acer et ultra
> legem tendere opus; sine nervis altera quidquid
> conposui pars esse putat similisque meorum
> mille die versus deduci posse. Trebati,
> quid faciam? praescribe. (1–5a)

In the second section (IB), Trebatius makes three proposals, which A. D. Leeman has shown quite clearly to reflect contemporary analysis of the *status*[5] of an action subject to legal proceedings.[6] In effect, Horace

[4] See below, notes 5 and 6.

[5] "The point on which two opposing parties come to grips or where the defendant makes a stand," *OLD*, s.v. *status*, 4. For further details, see G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1964) 306ff.

[6] A. D. Leeman, "Die Konsultierung des Trebatius: Statuslehre in Horaz, Serm. 2.1," *Festschrift für Robert Muth*, ed. P. Händel and W. Meid (Innsbruck 1983) 209–15. The purpose of such inquiry was to determine whether or not a given action should or could be undertaken (*status coniecturalis* = Trebatius' first suggestion—do not write poetry); whether it could be undertaken under another pretense (*status definitionis* = Trebatius' second suggestion—write epic poetry); or whether it could be justified or excused because of extenuating circumstances (*status qualitatis* = Trebatius' third suggestion—write "pane-

has portrayed for us with great accuracy the convincing scenario of a pre-trial examination of the case against Horace's satiric poetry in which the lawyer plays the part of the devil's advocate to help the litigant determine the best approach to be taken in his defense. Leeman's observation enhances our appreciation of the legal backdrop of the satire. Yet Horace has done more than depict a consultation between lawyer and client: this is the *mise-en-scène* for his discussion of satire. A closer look at Trebatius' suggestions and Horace's responses reveals a carefully balanced structure and style: each *status* question and reply is of approximately the same length (5–6–5 lines), and each is informed by allusion.

In the first (IB1), to Horace's response that he cannot stop writing poetry since he has insomnia, Trebatius counters with the recommendation that he swim the Tiber three times and drink plenty of wine:

> ter uncti
> transnanto Tiberim, somno quibus est opus alto,
> inriguumque mero sub noctem corpus habento. (7b–9)

As it happened, Trebatius enjoyed both swimming and drinking.[7] The humor of this advice would of course be lost unless one knew the foibles of the aquatic and bibulous lawyer. Furthermore, if the reader is to place the advice to Horace in the context of the *status* questioning, a legal format associated with Trebatius, the delicacy of the jest is all the more remarkable. The first allusion is thus personal and non-literary.

Trebatius makes his second suggestion (IB2) in terms which recall a proposal similarly phrased by Lucilius in Book 26:[8]

> aut si tantus amor scribendi te rapit, aude
> Caesaris invicti res dicere, multa laborum
> praemia laturus. (10–12a)

> hunc laborem sumas, laudem qui tibi ac fructum ferat.
> (Lucilius 620 M)

Trebatius' request for epic poetry combined with an appeal to its reward has for good reason led Marx and others to think not only of Lucilius 620 M but also of another verse quoted from Book 26:[9]

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gyric" satire). Leeman bases his interpretation of Trebatius' advice on the discussion of *status* near the conclusion of Cicero's *Topica* (92), which the orator dedicated to his younger protege Trebatius—the very lawyer consulted by Horace in *Sat.* 2.1.

[7] Cic. *ad Fam.* 7.10.2 and 7.22.1.

[8] Note the alliterative effect of l, m, and r in both texts.

[9] See F. Marx, *C. Lucilii Carminum Reliquiae* (Leipzig 1904–5) ad loc.; cf. C. Cichorius, *Untersuchungen zu Lucilius* (Zürich/Berlin 1964) 113–14, who, although disagreeing with Marx's attribution of the lines to Lucilius' interlocutor, accepts the association of 620 and 621 M. Most recently, F. Charpin, *Lucilius Satires* II (Paris 1979) 280 has rejected this long familiar collocation; he connects 620 M (= Charpin 26.30) with the fragments wherein

percrepa pugnam Popili, facta Corneli cane. (621 M)

Horace's reply ("cupidum, pater optime, vires / deficiunt . . .," 12b–13a) has then been compared with yet another line from Book 26:[10]

ego si, qui sum et quo folliculo nunc sum indutus, non queo. (622 M)

There are three points of contact between the Horatian and Lucilian lines: 1) a suggestion on how to attain wealth; 2) a directive to compose epic poetry celebrating military accomplishments; and 3) the inability to perform. Although we lack certainty about the relationship of the three Lucilian fragments (let alone the composition of the book as a whole),[11] it is tempting to conclude that Horace was imitating a Lucilian *recusatio*,[12] especially since Trebatius makes Lucilius and his poetry the subject of his third suggestion. Through the allusion, the defendant would refer his lawyer to a literary precedent for his refusal.[13]

Failing to convince Horace to give up poetry or to write epic, Trebatius urges that the poet continue with Lucilian *satura*, but reduce the caustic elements by concentrating on Octavian's civic virtues, i.e., write "panegyric" satire:

Lucilius rejects the notion of becoming a publican, 671–72 and 675 M (= Charpin 26.31–32; see pp. 126–27).

[10] See Marx ad loc. and Cichorius (above, note 9) 114. Charpin also links 622 M (= Charpin 26.33) with the publican fragments.

[11] Charpin (above, note 9) 125, note 9 presents a useful summary of the various analyses of Book 26.

[12] See Thill (above, note 3) 253–54; however, she argues that Horace has not imitated a specific text of Callimachus in the satire but turned only to Lucilius as model for his *recusatio*. There appears to be another Lucilian *recusatio* in Book 30, 1079–87 M (see Cichorius [above, note 9] 183–92). G. C. Fiske, *Lucilius and Horace. A Study in the Classical Theory of Imitation* (Madison 1920) 371–72, believes that the legal setting of 2.1 derives from this second *recusatio*. The consultation with Trebatius, however, and the hypothetical case before the *iudex* Octavian were more probably inspired by the Callimachean Apollo who "judges" the artistic proclamation of Phthonos at *H.* 2.105ff., as Wimmel (above, note 1) 164–65 observed, which passage Horace imitates in the following section of the poem (IB3); see below. In any event, there are no verbal contacts with the fragments of Book 30.

[13] B. Kytzler, "Das früheste Aeneas-Zitat," ΑΠΑΡΧΑΙ. *Untersuchungen zur klassischen Philologie und Geschichte des Altertums*, ed. F. Altheim, K. von Fritz, and G. Rhode, vol. 4 (Tübingen 1961) 151–67, has discovered a remarkable similarity between *Sat.* 2.1.7–15 and *Aen.* 2.8–16. However, introducing his interesting and provocative argument into consideration could obscure the point which I want to make. His findings nonetheless deserve close scrutiny. In sum, he argues that Horace had *Aen.* 2.8–16 in mind in lines 7–15 and that the satirist was referring his patrons to the one who was at that time in the process of composing the kind of poetry which they were requesting of him. This allusion would work quite nicely with the Lucilian allusion: the latter gives a precedent for a satirist's refusal, and the former points to an artist presently occupied in the task of writing epic poetry.

attamen et iustum poteras et scribere fortem,
Scipiadam ut sapiens Lucilius. (16–17)

To this Horace replies:

haud mihi dero,
cum res ipsa feret: nisi dextro tempore Flacci
verba per attentam non ibunt Caesaris aurem:
cui male si palpere, recalcitrat undique tutus. (17–20)

The poet compares Octavian to a horse which rejects an ill-timed rub-down.[14] Kiessling-Heinze, interpreting Horace literally, noted: "Vorläufig aber war Cäsar noch in der ferne mit der wichtigen und schwierigen Aufgabe der Reorganisation Asiens beschäftigt: das wäre für poetische Huldigungen ein *laevum tempus* (II.4.4)."[15] This may be so. However, neither they nor more recent critics have observed the cleverly fashioned allusion to the celebrated conclusion of Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo:[16]

ὁ Φθόνος Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπ' οὔατα λάθριος εἶπεν·
"οὐκ ἄγαμαι τὸν ἀοιδὸν ὃς οὐδ' ὅσα πόντος ἀείδει."
τὸν Φθόνον ὠπόλλων ποδί τ' ἤλασεν ὥδέ τ' ἔειπεν· . . . (105–7)

The image of Phthonos coming to the ear[17] of Apollo to criticize the writers of short verse and of his being repudiated by the god with a kick is delightfully recast as an equestrian metaphor. If he were truly φιλόμουσος[18] and could catch the allusion, Octavian would not receive a more appropriate or timely compliment: in the wake of his victory at Actium, the *Caesaris invicti res* of line 11,[19] he is implicitly compared with Apollo. We know from other sources that Octavian attributed his victory to Apollo's intervention.[20]

[14] Pseudo-Acro ad loc. first observed the equestrian metaphor.

[15] A. Kiessling and R. Heinze, *Q. Horatius Flaccus. Satiren* (Berlin 1959[7]) 182.

[16] In particular compare *per . . . Caesaris aurem* ~ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπ' οὔατα and *recalcitrat* ~ ποδί τ' ἤλασεν.

[17] The adjective *flaccus*, denoting drooping ears (see Varro *R.R.* 2.9.4), plays comically on the difference between the ears of Horace (drooping) and those of Octavian (attentive); note that *Flacci* and *aurem* occupy the same metrical positions at the ends of consecutive lines. Thus, Horace's cognomen does not merely function to create a strong contrast between the social status of the great Caesar and an unknown Flaccus (Kiessling-Heinze ad loc.; see also P. Lejay, *Oeuvres d'Horace. Satires* [Paris 1911] ad loc.) but sets in relief the ears of Horace and Octavian, an important clue for the reader.

[18] Theocritus so describes Ptolemy Philadelphus at *Id.* 14.61; he celebrates his patronage of the arts again at *Id.* 17.112–16 (see A. S. F. Gow, *Theocritus* [Cambridge 1952[2]] ad loc.). Such passing compliments are not foreign to Callimachus; cf. *H.* 1.85–90 and 4.116–95.

[19] Thus Kiessling-Heinze ad loc.

[20] E.g., Verg. *Aen.* 8.675ff. and Prop. 4.6.25ff.; see Roscher s.v. "Apollon," *Lexicon* I.1.448–49. On a different, but related point, Lejay (above, note 17) ad 2.1.2 notes that *tendere* (cf. *Odes* 1.1.34: *tendere barbiton*) and *sine nervis* (both in line 2 of the poem) are

Moreover, the interpretation which E. L. Bundy has made of the hymn's finale, recently defended by A. Köhnken,[21] applies also to the Horatian satire:[22]

> That Apollo spurns Phthonos and refuses to heed his insinuation means that far from rejecting Kallimachos' offering he graciously welcomes it. Indeed, we must view lines 105–12 as an objective representation of an internal dialogue wherein Apollo decides that the offense offered to his dignity through the poet's omissions is far outweighed by his delight in the purity of the song.

Through the allusion, Horace asserts that Octavian, the favorite of Apollo, would accept his own reluctance to sing the wrong kind of song and would prefer the poet's *bona carmina* (83–86). As we shall see below, Phthonos will return for a Horatian rebuff at the conclusion of the poem.

In sum, the three suggestions of Trebatius which constitute his examination of the *status* of the case against Horace's satire are balanced in structure (number of lines) and style (allusiveness). As I mentioned above, one might have expected the allusion to Callimachus because of the *recusatio* motif *per se*. There is, however, another reason which makes such an allusion likely: the presence of direct imitation of Callimachean texts in Horace's two other apologetic satires, 1.4 and 1.10.

Horace directed his earliest defense of satire (1.4) along two lines, which are argued in the two distinct halves of the poem: 1–63 (satire as poetry) and 64–143 (satire as non-threatening moral inquiry).

In the first half, to which I shall limit my discussion here, Horace questions whether satire, which is derived from Old Comedy, is in fact poetry. In an amusing example of specious logic, Horace argues that because people fear satirical verses they hate poets (*omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas*, 33); therefore, since what Horace writes may not be poetry after all, such hatred is invalid.[23] Horace borrows the statement which he attributes to the terrified public from the first Iamb in Callimachus' collection, as Pfeiffer first observed:[24]

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terms relevant to the lyre. Horace thus compares his satire to a lyre which either he strings too tightly (i.e., is too harsh in criticism) or which has no strings (i.e., lacks artistry; see lines 3–4). Being the instrument of Apollo, it may prepare the audience for the coming allusion.

[21] A. Köhnken, "Apollo's Retort to Envy's Criticism (Two Questions of Relevance in Callimachus, Hymn 2.105ff.)," *AJP* 102 (1981) 411–22.

[22] E. L. Bundy, "Quarrel between Kallimachos and Apollonios," *CSCA* 5 (1972) 92.

[23] Compare N. Rudd, *The Satires of Horace* (Berkeley 1982) 90. R. A. Lafleur, "Horace and the Law of Satire," *ANRW* 33.1 (1981) 1797, sees in Horace's argument an anticipation of a charge of libel which might be brought against his satire. I doubt that Horace took this line of defense seriously; I believe that he was more interested in playfully questioning the poetic nature of satire.

[24] R. Pfeiffer *Callimachus* I (Oxford 1949) ad loc.; see also D. L. Clayman, *Callimachus' Iambi* (Leiden 1980) 14–15.

omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas.
"faenum habet in cornu, longe fuge; dummodo risum
excutiat sibi, non hic cuiquam parcet amico
et quodcumque semel chartis inleverit, omnis
gestiet a furno redeuntis scire lacuque
et pueros et anus." (1.4.33–38a)

ἀλλ' ἢν ὁρῇ τις, "οὗτος Ἀλκμέων" φήσει
καὶ "φεῦγε· βάλλει· φεῦγ'" ἐρεῖ "τὸν ἄνθρωπον." 191.78–79 Pf.

Much as he does in the imitation of the end of the Hymn to Apollo in 2.1, Horace reworks the Callimachean image into an animal metaphor. The poet transforms the mad Alcmaeon into a bull with hay on its horns, the customary sign that the animal is mad.[25] Although the state of the text makes the dramatic situation of the Greek fragment uncertain, it is clear that the wider context of the iamb touches on the excessive criticism of *philologoi* against each other, the kind of criticism which Horace encountered, as is evident from Satires 1.10 and 2.1. The utterance, borrowed from Callimachus and set at the center of the first half (1–33; *34–38a*; 38b–63), dramatizes the improper reaction of the crowd to satire, against which mistaken point of view Horace addresses himself in this section of the poem. Structure and allusion to a specific text of Callimachus work hand-in-hand in Horace's defense.

In Satire 1.10, Horace responds to the unfavorable reaction of the *Lucili fautores* to his previous criticism of Lucilius in 1.4. Features of Callimachus' literary canon are very much in evidence in the first of three sections of the poem (1–35; 36–49; 50–92). Not only does the demand that satire utilize the principles of *brevitas* and *varietas* (1–19) bear a marked Callimachean stamp,[26] but in particular, in his argument for *latinitas* (20–35), Horace alludes to the famous epiphany of Apollo to the young Callimachus in the Proem to the *Aetia*:[27]

atque ego cum graecos facerem, natus mare citra,
versiculos, vetuit me tali voce Quirinus
post mediam noctem visus, cum somnia vera:
"in silvam non ligna feras insanius ac si
magnas Graecorum malis inplere catervas." (1.10.31–35)

καὶ γὰρ ὅτ]ε πρ[ώ]τιστον ἐμοῖς ἐπὶ δέλτον ἔθηκα
γούνασι]ν, Ἀ[πό]λλων εἶπεν ὅ μοι Λύκιος·
" . . . . .]. . . ἀοιδέ, τὸ μὲν θύος ὅττι πάχιστον
θρέψαι, τὴ]ν Μοῦσαν δ' ὠγαθὲ λεπταλέην·
πρὸς δέ σε] καὶ τόδ' ἄνωγα, τὰ μὴ πατέουσιν ἄμαξαι
τὰ στείβ[ιν ἑτέρων ἴχνια μὴ καθ' ὁμά

[25] See Plutarch, *Crassus* 7.

[26] Wimmel (above, note 1) 154–56.

[27] Wimmel (above, note 1) 156ff. and Thill (above, note 3) 242. Horace referred to this passage once more in the opening of perhaps his last (E. Fraenkel, *Horace* [Oxford 1957] 449) poem, *Ode* 4.15.

δίφρον ἐλ]ᾶν μηδ' οἶμον ἀνὰ πλατύν, ἀλλὰ κελεύθους
ἀτρίπτο]υς, εἰ καὶ στειν̣οτέρην ἐλάσεις."
(*Aetia* 1.21–28 Pf.)

Horace takes the advice of Quirinus, and, I believe, we are meant to observe the result in what follows. In a kind of priamel, Horace begins from turgid Alpinus as negative exemplar (36–39), proceeds to list contemporary artists who have succeeded in their various fields (Fundanius in comedy, Pollio in tragedy, Varius in epic, and Vergil in bucolic poetry; 40–45), and concludes by proclaiming the superiority of his satire over other contemporary practitioners of the genre, although conceding first place to the genre's inventor. I find it significant that the poet begins the "priamel" with a passing reference to the famous river image from the Hymn to Apollo (*turgidus Alpinus ... Rheni luteum caput*, 36–37) and that immediately afterward he alludes to the same passage (*at dixi fluere hunc lutulentulum ...*, 50).[28] The appearance of Horace in his list of great artists comes between references to the Callimachean river metaphor and follows the epiphany of Quirinus which is inspired by that of Apollo in the *Aetia* prologue. The poet would have us believe that Quirinus appeared to him at a decisive moment of his career. Horace thus seems to claim for himself a place among the foremost artists of his day as the preeminent, Callimachean satirist.[29]

I now return to Satire 2.1. In the second half of the poem, we observe a structure which reflects in reverse and at slightly greater length the structure of the first (IA ~ IIA′; IB ~ IIB′). In IIB′1, Trebatius introduces the objection that satire makes everyone uneasy, and that it is unpopular to all (a),[30] to which Horace replies that his nature compels him to write critical poetry (b). In IIB′3, the structure of the three-line comment of Trebatius followed by Horatian counterargument is duplicated: Trebatius states that satire is unpopular to the powerful (a), to which Horace replies that, like Lucilius, he too has powerful friends to protect him (b). This structure (note that there is a numerical parity: 3/16 [IIB′1] ~ 3/17 [IIB′3]) sets off the central section, which carries the main point of Horace's "legal" argument: he will use satire only as a defensive weapon (IIB′2).

[28] Ἀσσυρίου ποταμοῖο μέγας ῥόος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλά
λύματα γῆς καὶ πολλὸν ἐφ' ὕδατι συφρετὸν ἕλκει. (108–9)

Horace also referred to this passage in *Sat.* 1.4 at line 11.

[29] There is another Callimachean connection to be found in the satire. At lines 78–91, Horace describes his preferred audience. In a clear statement of opposition to Lucilius' audience of the moderately educated (588–89, 592, 595–96 M; cf. Cic. *Fin.* 1.7 and *de Orat.* 2.6.25, which provide the commentary), Horace chooses the learned *pauci* over the uneducated *turba* (1.10.73–74). See Wimmel (above, note 1) 162.

[30] *Cum sibi quisque timet, quamquam est intactus, et odit* (23) must refer back to the popular fear of the satirist against which Horace argues in *Sat.* 1.4.33ff.

In response to Trebatius' fear for the poet's physical and social life, Horace replies in IIB'3 that he, like Lucilius, has powerful friends, and he adds that the *invidia* of his detractors would find Horace a "solid" opponent (77–78).[31] Structurally, this section corresponds to IB3 where Horace had alluded to the end of the Hymn to Apollo. Mention of *invidia* thus carries a special significance in light of the earlier allusion. There Horace had assumed for himself Phthonos' punishment—a kick from the judge—if he should write the wrong kind of poetry. Near the end of the satire, he devises a punishment of his own imagination for *invidia*—loss of a tooth:

> tamen me
> cum magnis vixisse invita fatebitur usque
> invidia et fragili quaerens inlidere dentem
> offendet solido.... (75b–78a)

Given Callimachus' sense of humor, I am certain that he would have approved of Horace's delightful transmogrification of his Apollo-Phthonos encounter.[32]

The final section (IIA') balances the opening of the poem (IA): Horace initiates the concluding dialogue, as he had concluded the introduction, with an address to Trebatius: *nisi quid tu, docte Trebati, / dissentis* (78–79; cf. verses 4–5: *Trebati, / quid faciam? praescribe*). Trebatius warns Horace of the possibility of facing a civil suit if he should compose libelous poetry (*mala carmina*) against anyone. Horace replies with the quip that he plans not to write poor (understanding *mala* in a literary sense) but excellent (*bona*) poetry, especially if Caesar should be the judge. In this case, a praetor would dismiss the suit with a laugh.[33] The hypothetical situation in which Octavian acts as *iudex* functions not only within the legal facade of the satire so brilliantly cast in

[31] See P. H. L. Eggermont, "Quaeritur num Horatius se nuce comparet. Serm. 2.1 vs. 74–80," *Mnemosyne* 10 (1941–42) 69–76 for an interesting discussion of Horace's image here.

[32] Horace's statement on creative imitation at *A.P.* 131–35 is an appropriate commentary on his successful use of the Callimachean passage:

> publica materies privati iuris erit, si
> non circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem
> nec verbo verbum curabis reddere fidus
> interpres nec desilies imitator in artum,
> unde pedem proferre pudor vetet aut operis lex....

Note that line 132 looks to the Callimachean artistic canon; see *Aetia* 1.25–28, quoted above.

[33] The praetor would throw such a case out of court even *in iure*, since the *iudex* to whom the decision would be given (Octavian in this instance) has already made up his mind (*sed bona siquis / iudice condiderit laudatus Caesare?*, 83–84). See Leeman (above, note 6) 212–13.

the analysis of the *status* of Horace's satire, but also within the allusion to the Hymn to Apollo of Callimachus, in which the god acts as *iudex*. The divinity had judged that Callimachus' short, finely crafted hymn was superior to the encomium of epic proportions; likewise, Octavian would accept Horace's demurral to write panegyric as well as epic. Therefore, with Octavian as judge in a trial determining the quality of Horace's poetry, the Apollonian judge would vote in favor of the Callimachean satirist.

Horace, we must conclude, proves consistent in his use of allusion to a specific Callimachean text in his programmatic satires. With regard to 2.1 in particular, Fraenkel has stated that "the satire deals almost exclusively with the moral justification of his satires, or, to put it differently, with their contents; only in passing (2ff. . . .) does he mention the unfavorable criticism which their style has met in certain quarters."[34] When we recognize, however, the allusion to the finale of the Hymn to Apollo, so ingeniously set within a judicial context, we must grant more importance than critics have allowed to the stylistic claim which Horace has made by direct reference to Callimachus. While Horace looks to Lucilius as a model for the writing of confessional satire,[35] the key factor determining the difference between the two artists, which Horace has emphasized in 1.4 and 1.10, is his allegiance to the Callimachean canon of careful workmanship in poetic composition.[36] Satire 2.1 bears witness to this claim.[37]

[34] Fraenkel (above, note 27) 147.

[35] Rudd (above, note 23) 125 and especially C. O. Brink, *Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles* (Cambridge 1963) 172–73.

[36] Thill's chapter (above, note 3, 224–62) on the relation between Horace and Callimachus contains a useful summary of the many points of contact between the two artists. See also the earlier work of F. Wehrli, "Horaz und Kallimachos," *MH* 1 (1944) 69–76 and J. V. Cody, *Horace and Callimachean Aesthetics*, Collection Latomus 147 (Brussels 1976).

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